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P UBLIC H EA LTH A ND BIOS EC URIT Y 
The Limits of Government 
Regulation of Science 
 
 
A transparent institutional review process 
will balance scientiﬁc freedom and national 
security better than publication restrictions. 
 
John D. Kraemer1,2  and Lawrence  O. Gostin2* 
 
ast summer, two research teams 
funded by the National Institutes of 
Health genetically modif ied H5N1 
avian  influenza  vir uses,  making  them 
capable of eff icient respiratory transmis- 
sion between ferrets. Ferrets are thought 
to be a good animal model for inﬂuenza in 
humans. A small number of genetic changes 
might be able to convert the presently zoo- 
notic H5N1 virus into a pathogen with dan- 
gerous pandemic potential—transmissible 
 
 
 
ology and results could become a blueprint 
for bioterrorism (1). 
The U.S. government’s request not to 
publish key scientiﬁc ﬁndings sparked con- 
siderable controversy. To many research- 
ers, knowledge about what mutations enable 
respiratory transmission is essential to sur- 
veillance of and early action against vari- 
ants of H5N1. They worry that government 
intrusion into scientif ic innovation would 
discourage vital research. However, security 
 
 
 
about building a hydrogen bomb, even though 
the information was in the public domain; the 
injunction was later vacated when the article 
was published elsewhere (2). In 2005, the 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sci- 
ences refused to comply with an HHS request 
to decline publishing a mathematical model 
of botulism in the milk supply (3). The H5N1 
case, however, is the ﬁrst time government has 
sought to redact information after an institu- 
tionalized HHS review process. 
 
The court ruled that federally funded scientiﬁc research, 
especially at universities, should be free from prior restraint— 
calling into question the validity  of CUI conditions  on 
research grants. 
Constitutional Limits on Government 
Restrictions of Scientiﬁc Publications 
The First Amendment to the U.S. Consti- 
tution affords considerable protection to 
political, artistic, and scientiﬁc expression, 
that could trigger “strict scrutiny” by the 
Supreme Court (4). The court is most vig- 
orous in reviewing government restraints 
from human-to-human, with a >50% case- 
fatality rate. The National Science Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity (NSABB), which 
advises the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), recommended that 
two journals, Science and Nature, redact 
key information before publication. The 
NSABB and HHS expressed concerns that 
published details about the papers’ method- 
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advocates believe the greater risk is that the 
mutated virus could escape or that knowl- 
edge about these mutations could get into the 
wrong hands. They suggest that research of 
this kind should not be funded or undertaken 
in the ﬁrst place. Where, as here, the research 
has already been conducted, they urge sci- 
entiﬁc journals not to publish any sensitive 
methods or results (1). 
The HHS request reveals a troubled rela- 
tionship between security and science. This is 
not the ﬁrst time a government has requested 
that a journal not publish information. In 
1979, the U.S. Department of Energy secured 
an injunction against the magazine The Pro- 
gressive to prevent the publication of an article 
on speech in advance of publication, which 
it calls “prior restraints.” Prior restraints are 
uniquely threatening to First Amendment 
values because they prevent ideas from ever 
being heard (5). 
Had the government compelled the H5N1 
researchers to cease research or the journals 
to withhold publication—whether through 
the force of law or by creating adverse con- 
sequences such as loss of funding—it could 
have violated the First Amendment. Even 
informal systems of restraint can be uncon- 
stitutional, such as a government threat to 
prosecute publishers (5). In this case, how- 
ever, HHS’ request, by its own terms, was 
nonbinding, and the journals had discre- 
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tion whether or not to comply (6). Given 
the absence of legal force or undue induce- 
ments or penalties, the government’s request 
to withhold information does not violate the 
First Amendment. 
There are situations in which a govern- 
ment has the authority to block scientif ic 
communications. The clearest case is when 
research has been properly classiﬁed under 
federal law and the person seeking to com- 
municate f indings obtained it under the 
terms of a security clearance—whether they 
are still working for the government or not, 
so long as procedural requirements are met 
(7). Although a researcher is obliged to keep 
classiﬁed information conﬁdential, publish- 
ers who obtain that information lawfully have 
a right to publish. In the Pentagon Papers 
case, the Supreme Court held that President 
Nixon did not overcome the “heavy presump- 
on research grants. The wider the scope of 
CUI conditions, the more likely that courts 
will invalidate them (4). 
The Supreme Court’s “unconstitutional 
conditions” doctrine holds that government 
may not place conditions on public fund- 
ing that require the recipient to surrender 
First Amendment rights. Thus, government 
has no obligation to provide research fund- 
ing, but if it chooses to, it cannot restrain the 
free expression of researchers without a com- 
pelling state interest. For example, a federal 
appellate court recently struck down HHS 
guidelines requiring recipients of AIDS pre- 
vention funding to pledge their opposition to 
prostitution, reasoning that it was an uncon- 
stitutional condition (10). 
The unconstitutional conditions doctrine, 
however, is hard to decipher. For example, the 
Supreme Court upheld HHS prohibitions on 
lication edits without a speciﬁc license. In 
essence, OFAC argued that editing a paper 
was providing a service to foreign authors in 
violation of trade embargoes. In 2004, OFAC 
reversed that decision and allowed normal 
scientiﬁc editing to occur (14). Had OFAC 
not reversed itself, First Amendment chal- 
lenges against the policy likely would have 
prevailed (15). 
 
Access to Sensitive Data Under the Freedom 
of Information Act 
A functioning democracy requires that citi- 
zens be able to access information in the 
government’s possession, but not if access 
poses an unacceptable security risk. The 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) bal- 
ances these concerns by affording access to 
federal agency records unless the records 
fall within a statutory exemption. Federal 
agencies support much of the research in the 
United States, including both of the recent 
Could the public obtain sensitive data that have been redacted 
from publications through a FOIA request? If so, governmental 
requests to redact sensitive information  would be fruitless. 
H5N1 studies. Could the public obtain sensi- 
tive data that have been redacted from publi- 
cations through a FOIA request? If so, gov- 
ernmental requests to redact sensitive infor- 
mation would be fruitless. 
FOIA applies only to “agency records,” 
tion” against prior restraint when he sought 
to prohibit publication of classiﬁed materials. 
The court found that an undeﬁned concept of 
“security” did not “abrogate the fundamental 
law embodied in the First Amendment” (8). 
It is far less clear whether government 
may suppress the publication of research con- 
ducted with government funding when the 
results are “controlled unclassiﬁed informa- 
tion” (CUI) [sometimes referred to as “sen- 
sitive but unclassiﬁed” (SBU)] under con- 
ditions set by government grants or con- 
tracts. Traditionally, the federal government 
restricted communication about basic sci- 
ence research only through classif ication. 
However, CUI restrictions have become more 
common, and no court has directly addressed 
their constitutionality. Although it is unclear 
how often CUI clauses include a prepublica- 
tion review requirement, research suggests 
that they occur with some regularity (9). 
Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Jr. 
University v. Sullivan is the most pertinent 
case for evaluating CUI restrictions. Stanford 
University challenged an NIH conﬁdential- 
ity clause that required the university to seek 
prior approval before publishing preliminary 
ﬁndings about artiﬁcial heart research to pro- 
tect the public from unvalidated research ﬁnd- 
ings. The court ruled that federally funded 
scientiﬁc research, especially at universities, 
should be free from prior restraint—calling 
into question the validity of CUI conditions 
the use of family planning funds to counsel 
women regarding abortion, reasoning that 
government is entitled to subsidize one pro- 
tected right (family planning), while refusing 
to subsidize analogous rights (abortion coun- 
seling) (11). The court similarly upheld the 
government’s right to withhold funding to any 
public university that denied access to mili- 
tary recruiters, even though the universities 
claimed it violated their freedom to disap- 
prove of the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” 
rule. The court said the law neither denied the 
institutions the right to speak nor required 
them to say anything (12). 
 
Scientiﬁc Publication from Countries 
Subjected to U.S. Economic Sanctions 
In the past, the federal government has 
impeded scientif ic publication processes, 
not because of articles’ content but rather 
because the authors were from countries 
against which the United States had imposed 
economic sanctions. The Department of 
Treasury’s Ofﬁce of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) enforces these economic sanctions. 
For a brief period in 2003, OFAC restricted the 
review process for scientiﬁc papers submit- 
ted from countries sanctioned by the United 
States (13). In particular, OFAC informed the 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engi- 
neers (IEEE) that, although its journals could 
subject papers from sanctioned countries to 
peer review, they could not make prepub- 
so a threshold issue is whether university 
research data acquired under a grant constitute 
an agency record. In 1980, the Supreme Court 
ruled that research data produced under an 
NIH grant and used in regulatory proceedings 
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration 
did not constitute an agency record subject 
to FOIA because it was retained by the non- 
governmental grantee. The court found that 
FOIA required the agency to either produce 
or obtain permanent custody of the data (16). 
The “Shelby amendment,” enacted in 
1999, expanded public access to data pro- 
duced at universities and other nonprof it 
research entities under federal grants. The 
public can request the data if they were pro- 
duced under a federal grant and “cited pub- 
lically and ofﬁcially by the Federal Govern- 
ment in support of an agency action that has 
the force and effect of law” (17). Federal agen- 
cies could take care not to ofﬁcially cite highly 
sensitive data, thereby avoiding a successful 
FOIA request. However, it is not always sim- 
ple or easy to refrain from referencing sensi- 
tive research. The NIH, for example, might 
reasonably refer to the H5N1 research as jus- 
tiﬁcation for revising biosecurity policies. 
Even if sensitive data do become part of 
an agency record, FOIA provides the federal 
government with ample authority to refuse 
a request on security grounds. FOIA pro- 
vides nine exemptions under which records 
that would otherwise have to be disclosed 
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may be withheld, one of which is for “mat- 
ters that are speciﬁcally authorized under cri- 
teria established by an executive order to be 
kept secret in the interest of national defense 
or foreign policy and are in fact properly clas- 
siﬁed pursuant to such an executive order” 
(18). Through this exception, Congress has 
acknowledged broad executive authority to 
classify records so long as it is done lawfully 
pursuant to an executive order. 
President Obama’s 2009 Executive Order 
13526 revises existing classiﬁcation stan- 
dards (19). Although it was designed to 
reduce the amount of classiﬁed materials, 
the executive order affords agencies con- 
siderable discretion to classify on security 
grounds. Consistent with prior policy, the 
executive order mandates that “basic scien- 
tiﬁc research information not clearly related 
to the national interest shall not be classi- 
ﬁed.” However, the order permits the classi- 
ﬁcation of “scientiﬁc, technical, or economic 
matters relating to the national security,” pro- 
vided that disclosure is reasonably expected 
“to cause identiﬁable or describable damage 
to the national security.” Furthermore, agen- 
cies may classify data that meet the execu- 
tive order’s standards even if the data were 
not classiﬁed at the time of the FOIA request 
(19). Thus, federal agencies have wide 
authority to prevent the release of research 
information through a FOIA request simply 
by classifying it, provided that there are legit- 
imate national security justiﬁcations. 
In 2010, President Obama issued a fur- 
ther executive order stating that CUI is not 
automatically exempt from FOIA (20). Thus, 
to ensure that sensitive biological research 
information is not disclosed, agencies would 
have to classify it. [Certain nonbiological 
research, such as nuclear energy, is automati- 
cally exempt from FOIA, as are the locations 
where select biological agents are held (21).] 
Some research data also might be protected 
under FOIA exemptions for trade secrets 
or predecisional deliberative memoranda 
within the government, but these options are 
limited (22). 
The law, then, draws a distinction between 
classiﬁed and controlled unclassiﬁed infor- 
mation. However, from a constitutional per- 
spective, it would be troubling if the result 
turned solely on the label the government 
placed on the data. If the result did turn on the 
label, the government could simply relabel 
research from CUI to classiﬁed and thus pro- 
hibit its dissemination. Although decisions to 
classify can be challenged, prevailing is dif- 
ﬁcult, and unnecessary classiﬁcation is com- 
mon (23). This appears to place too much dis- 
cretion in the hands of public ofﬁcials. 
The problem of government discretion is 
compounded by highly inconsistent practices 
among federal agencies in the classiﬁcation 
systems they use. There is inconsistency of 
structure (the labels attached, such as classi- 
ﬁed, CUI, SBU, or other terminology), as well 
as in the application of that structure to indi- 
vidual documents (no clear standard exists 
for deciding whether to classify particular 
information). In short, the line between clas- 
siﬁed and CUI remains unclear, as agencies 
struggle to apply President Obama’s execu- 
tive orders (24). 
 
Balancing Scientiﬁc Freedom, Constitutional 
Values, and Biosecurity 
The federal government has the power to 
prevent the dissemination of sensitive life- 
sciences research, but there are good rea- 
sons to exercise that power sparingly. The 
current system of deliberation by a federal 
expert advisory board and HHS-issued vol- 
untary recommendations is preferable to for- 
mal government mandates. Although we do 
not have all the data, the NSABB process in 
the H5N1 cases appears reasonable, given 
that unredacted publication could enable bad 
actors with scientif ic skill to replicate the 
studies, with profoundly harmful effects. The 
federal government has promised to share the 
researchers’ methods and conclusions with 
scientists with a need to know, which substan- 
tially advances scientiﬁc objectives. 
Can the review process for high-risk bio- 
logic research be improved further? The 
NSABB’s origins can be traced to the so- 
called Fink report issued in 2004 by the 
National Research Council (21). However, 
vital aspects of the Fink report have not been 
implemented. In particular, the Fink report 
proposed an institutional review process for 
biological “experiments of concern”—those 
falling into seven research classes, making 
the pathogen considerably more attractive 
as a bioterrorism agent (e.g., by enhancing 
virulence or transmissibility or by rendering 
vaccines ineffective). This approach was pat- 
terned on the Institutional Biosafety Commit- 
tees (IBCs) required by NIH for recombinant 
DNA research at institutions receiving fed- 
eral funding, which generally have been con- 
sidered to be successful (21). 
HHS, in partnership with institutions, 
will have to ensure that the IBC model works 
effectively: (i) institutions must develop the 
requisite expertise to review dual-use research 
of concern; (ii) HHS must specify the cat- 
egories of research requiring institutional 
review—minimally including the seven types 
of high-risk experiments; and (iii) HHS must 
set clear and consistent standards for institu- 
tional review. If IBCs are formally designated 
to conduct the institutional review function, 
HHS will have to clarify whether NSABB 
will guide and oversee the process (21). In 
addition, because IBCs may recommend 
that researchers voluntarily restrict access to 
methods or results in some instances, it will 
be important for HHS to develop a system for 
managing access to sensitive data and for dis- 
seminating it to those with a need to know in 
a fair manner. 
If HHS improves its functioning, the insti- 
tutional review process can ensure a sound 
balance between scientif ic freedom and 
national security. A fair, transparent process 
undertaken by research institutions, with a 
balanced approach to scientiﬁc beneﬁts and 
public safety, together with HHS guidance 
and oversight of high-risk research, is prefer- 
able to government constraints on scientiﬁc 
information by force of law. 
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